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The Economic Integration of Forced Migrants:  
Evidence for Post-War Germany
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The flight and expulsion of Germans from Eastern Europe during and after World War II 
constitutes one of the largest forced population movements in history. We analyze the 
economic integration of these forced migrants and their offspring in West Germany. The 
empirical results suggest that even a quarter of a century after displacement, first generation 
migrants and native West Germans that were comparable before the war perform strikingly 
different. Migrants have substantially lower incomes and are less likely to own a house or to 
be self-employed. Displaced agricultural workers, however, have significantly higher 
incomes. This income gain can be explained by faster transitions out of low-paid agricultural 
work. Differences in the labor market performance of second generation migrants resemble 
those of the first generation. We also find that displacement considerably weakens the 
intergenerational transmission of human capital between fathers and children, especially at 
the lower tail of the skill distribution. 
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The mass exodus of Germans from Eastern Europe to West Germany during and after World War II marks
one of the largest forced population movements in history. It involved millions of Germans who ﬂed or were
expelled, most of them from the former eastern territories of the German Reich. In 1950, displaced Germans
(Heimatvertriebene) accounted for nearly 17 percent of the total West German population. Their integration
posed a paramount challenge for the war-ridden country. West Germany’s cities, infrastructure and housing
stock laid in ruins, and the displaced arrived with hardly any possessions. Although prospects looked grim
initially, integration has been viewed as swift and successful by the contemporary German public. This
paper provides a comprehensive empirical analysis of the medium- and long-run economic integration of
the displaced and their offspring, and explores to what extent such a positive view is indeed justiﬁed. Our
results suggest that it is largely not.
The question of how immigrants integrate into the economy of the destination country is a major theme
in migration research (Bauer et al., 2005; Kerr and Kerr, 2011). Following the seminal study by Chiswick
(1978), empirical studies on the economic integration of immigrants have mostly focused on the US and
on the relative earnings of ﬁrst generation migrants who migrated voluntarily (see Borjas, 1999, for a sur-
vey). Far less attention has been devoted to other economic outcomes, such as unemployment, occupational
status, or wealth, and to the economic integration of second generation migrants (Kerr and Kerr, 2011).1
Furthermore, only a few studies have investigated the integration of migrants who have been forced to mi-
grate because of natural disasters, wars, or ethnic conﬂicts.2 This is despite the fact that forced migration
is a problem of global scale. At the end of 2009, more than 43 million people were forcefully uprooted
because of conﬂict and persecution alone (UNHCR, 2010).
Our study of forced migrants in post-war Germany provides a comprehensive analysis of a major migra-
tion episode in world history and broadens the scope of the existing integration literature in several respects.
We consider forced rather than voluntary migrants and study both ﬁrst and second generation migrants.
Moreover, and unlike most of the few studies on forced migrants, we are able to investigate medium- and
long-run outcomes.3 Last but not least, we consider a broader set of outcomes than most studies. Apart
from income, we explore also unemployment, the occupational status and sectoral afﬁliation of individuals,
home ownership, the sectoral and regional post-displacement mobility of migrants, and their educational
attainment.
From an analytical perspective, our speciﬁc historical setting provides a natural experiment that allows
us to abstract from many confounding factors that usually aggravate the analysis of the integration of mi-
grants. First, displacement was not conﬁned to a selective sub-group of Germans in Eastern Europe, e.g.,
1Among the notable exceptions are Algan et al. (2010) who provide a comprehensive comparative analysis of the performance
of ﬁrst and second generation immigrants in France, Germany, and the UK. The authors do not only concentrate on wages but also
study differences in employment and educational attainment.
2Notable exceptions are Ib´ a˜ nez and V´ elez (2008) who study the welfare consequences of displacement in Colombia; Kondylis
(2007, 2008) who investigates displaced persons from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Rwanda; Vigdor (2007), Groen and Polivka
(2008), and Sacerdote (2009) who study persons displaced by hurricane Katrina in the US; and Sarvim¨ aki et al. (2009) who study
Fins forced to re-settle from areas ceded to the Soviet Union after World War II.
3Except for the study by Sarvim¨ aki et al. (2009), all of the work on forced migration cited above focuses exclusively on short-run
outcomes measured mostly only one to three years after displacement.
2to those that could expect to gain from migrating. Empirical problems associated with selective migration
(Borjas, 1991), therefore, do not arise. Second, selective re-migration (Lubotsky, 2007) is no problem either,
as forced migrants could not return to their homelands that lay beyond the Iron Curtain. Third, displaced
Germans from Eastern Europe and native West Germans spoke the same language and were very homoge-
neous in their culture and education. Language acquisition and the transferability of skills, both notoriously
difﬁcult to measure, thus do not play a role for the integration process. Fourth, the vast majority of forced
migrants arrived in West Germany within a relatively brief period of time (1944-1946). As a consequence,
differential cohort and time effects that arise if cohorts of migrants of different average productivity enter
the destination economy in different phases of the economic cycle (Borjas, 1999) are not encountered in our
analysis. Our dataset also provides detailed information on the socio-demographic and labor market char-
acteristics of migrants prior to displacement. We are thus able to control for potential pre-war differences
between the displaced and native West Germans.
Our ﬁndings show that even a quarter of a century after displacement, forced migrants and native West
Germans that were comparable before the war perform strikingly different in post-war Germany.4 In 1971,
ﬁrst generation migrants still exhibit signiﬁcantly lower average incomes, a higher risk of unemployment,
and a lower likelihood to own residential property. Displacement, however, was far from uniform in its
effects across migrants of different background. Most notably, we ﬁnd a large positive income differential
foragriculturalworkersthathavebeendisplacedinthewakeofWorldWarII.5 Weshowthatthisdifferential,
and also income differences more generally, can be explained by the massive changes in the occupational
and sectoral employment structure of forced migrants that were induced by displacement. Displacement
accelerated transitions out of agriculture, increased blue-collar employment, and reduced self-employment
among migrants.
Differences in the labor market performance of second generation migrants largely resemble those of the
ﬁrst generation. Second generation men also have lower incomes than their native West German peers, and
both men and women exhibit markedly lower home ownership rates. Furthermore, displacement-induced
changes in the sectoral and occupational structure of ﬁrst generation migrants largely carry over to their
offspring. There is also evidence that migrant children tend to acquire more education than their native
peers. In fact, intergenerational upward mobility in education is much higher among the displaced. This
ﬁnding may be explained by the fact that the loss of family wealth, businesses and farms forced the children
of migrants to compete on the wider labor market, and in particular to look for work outside agriculture.
Formal education, as a consequence, became more important for individual economic success.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We ﬁrst provide a brief historical overview of
4Earlier results by L¨ uttinger (1986) already cast doubt on the view that the integration of the displaced had been swift and
largely a success. L¨ uttinger (1986) uses the same data as we do but does not account in his analysis for pre-war differences between
the displaced and native West Germans. He also does not analyze the relative incomes of forced migrants. Schmidt (1997) also
includes ethnic Germans that migrated to West Germany after 1942 in his analysis of wage assimilation of migrants in Germany.
Using cross-sectional data from 1982 and 1990, he does not ﬁnd large differences between ethnic German immigrants and natives.
However, also Schmidt (1997) is not able to account for pre-war differences in the two groups.
5This result is broadly consistent with evidence provided by Sarvim¨ aki et al. (2009) who study the displacement of Fins from
areas ceded to the Soviet Union in the aftermath of World War II. Sarvim¨ aki et al. (2009) ﬁnd a positive effect of displacement on
the long-term income of male Fins who lived in rural areas before displacement. They do not, however, provide separate regressions
for those that had been employed in agriculture before the war.
3the mass exodus of Germans from Eastern Europe and discuss measures that were taken by policy makers
to integrate these migrants in West Germany. Section 3 presents the data we use and provides summary
statistics on the pre-war socio-economic structure of the migrant and native West German populations.
Section 4 outlines our empirical strategy for identifying the effects that displacement has on the relative
economic performance of migrants in West Germany. Section 5 presents our results for the ﬁrst generation
of forced migrants, and Section 6 our results for their offspring. Finally, Section 7 summarizes our key
ﬁndings and concludes.
2 Historical Background
During the mass exodus of German civilians from Eastern Europe, millions of Germans were uprooted and
re-settled in the territory of the later West German state (Federal Republic of Germany).6 In September
1950, forced migrants totaled 7.9 millions and accounted for 16.5 percent of the West German population
(Federal Statistical Ofﬁce, 1955). As a result, and despite heavy war losses, the West German population
increased dramatically from 39.4 million in 1939 to 47.7 million in 1950. By far the largest number of
forced migrants came from the Eastern territories of the German Reich that Germany lost after World War II
(see Figure 1 for an overview of Germany’s territorial losses between 1919 and 1945). In September 1950,
these so-called Reichsdeutsche numbered about 4.4 millions and accounted for more than 55 percent of all
forced migrants in West Germany. Another 1.9 millions displaced individuals came from Czechoslovakia,
predominantly from the Sudetenland.7 A large number of the displaced had also resided in those territories
that Germany had ceded after World War I, such as Danzig and West Prussia. Forced migrants were not a
selected group of the German populations living in Eastern Europe but represented a complete cross-section
of Germans in these regions, since their re-settlement was comprehensive and universal, and thus beyond
individual choice.
The displacement of Germans from Eastern Europe started in the autumn of 1944. A closing-in front
line and fear of atrocities by advancing Soviet troops caused hundreds of thousands of Germans to ﬂee
westwards. As ﬁnal defeat became imminent, they were joined by a growing number of Germans who ﬂed
for fear that liberated non-German populations would take revenge for the suffering and harm the Nazis
had inﬂicted upon them. After the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany in May 1945, large-scale
disorganized (so called ‘wild’) expulsions of Germans followed, mainly from Poland and Czechoslovakia,
which Germany had occupied during the war. In the eyes of many, German atrocities during the occupation
had rendered future peaceful cohabitation impossible.
The Potsdam Treaty of August 1945 between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet
Union shifted Germany’s eastern border westwards. Germany lost East Prussia, Silesia, and two thirds
of Pomerania, which together accounted for approximately 24 percent of Germany’s land size in 1937.
With the exception of parts of East Prussia that fell to Russia, these territories were placed under Polish
administrative control. The German territory west of the Oder-Neisse line was divided into a British, a
6See Connor (2007) for a detailed account of the exodus.
7Though mainly inhabited by ethnic Germans, the Sudetenland had become part of the independent Czechoslovak state after
World War I when Austria-Hungary broke apart. It was annexed by Nazi Germany in September 1938.
4French, an American, and a Soviet zone of occupation. The ﬁrst three of these were later joined to form the
Federal Republic of Germany (founded in May 1949); the latter became the German Democratic Republic
(October 1949). The Potsdam Treaty also stipulated that German populations in the ceded territories and in
post-war Poland at large, as well as Germans in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, were to be expelled. Most
of these ‘organized’ expulsions were carried out in the course of 1946. They continued, albeit on a much
smaller scale, into the late 1940s. By 1950, the mass expulsions of Germans from their homelands in Eastern
and Central Europe had ﬁnally come to a close.
FIG. 1: German Territorial Losses in World War I and II
The integration of millions of forced migrants posed a paramount challenge for post-war West Germany.
The displaced, having lost both their homes and savings, arrived with hardly any possessions. West Ger-
many’s infrastructure and industry were devastated, and signiﬁcant parts of Germany’s main food-growing
areas in the east had been lost. In the ﬁrst post-war years, housing was the major problem.8 The two major
parties in West Germany, the social-democratic SPD and the conservative CDU, actively sought to achieve
legal, political, and economic equality between the displaced and the native West German population (Con-
nor, 2007). To this end, several measures were taken. One of the most important was the ‘Law of Equal-
ization of Burden’ (Lastenausgleichsgesetz). It provided compensation to forced migrants (and indigenous
West Germans) for their loss of property, and sought to spread the burden of war more equally in society.9
8In West-German cities (with a population of 20,000 or above), more than 40 percent of the pre-war housing stock was destroyed
(Deutscher St¨ adtetag, 1949).
9See Hughes (1999) for a detailed account of how the war-damaged were compensated for their losses.
5Those whose property had remained unaffected by the war were to compensate the war-damaged. Amongst
other sources, funds for compensation were derived from a levy on capital that had remained wholly or
partly intact. Unlike other European countries, therefore, West Germany actively sought, by law, to redis-
tribute wealth in order to (at least partially) restore the pre-war distribution of property. Under the same law,
the displaced could also apply for grants to set up businesses and for public assistance in ﬁnding housing. A
second major legislative initiative was the ‘Expellee Land Resettlement Law’ (Fl¨ uchtlingssiedlungsgesetz)
of 1949. The law aimed at fostering the integration of forced migrants in agriculture and provided tax
incentives for the lease or purchase of farms.
Despite the dismal prospects in 1945, economic recovery was surprisingly swift. Following the cur-
rency reform in June 1948, industrial production picked up rapidly and almost doubled by 1950. Despite
occasional slowdowns, growth remained strong for most of the 1950s and 1960s. Unemployment, too, fell
steadily from 11 percent in 1950 (its post-war peak) to 1.3 percent in 1960, and remained at low levels
until the beginning of the 1970s. In fact, already from the mid 1950s onward, labor was in increasingly
high demand. Forced migrants provided an important labor reservoir for the booming post-war industry and
prevented labor shortages despite booming demand (Ambrosius, 1996). It is for this reason that migrants
are considered an important element of Germany’s rapid recovery after the war, a recovery that led contem-
poraries in the 1960s and 1970s to view the integration of displaced Germans as a success story (L¨ uttinger,
1986).
3 Data and Pre-War Differences
For our analysis of the relative economic performance of forced migrants and their offspring in West
Germany we use individual-level data from the German 1971 supplementary microcensus (Mikrozensus-
Zusatzerhebung, 1971). This ofﬁcial, nation-wide, and compulsory survey was explicitly conducted in the
early 1970s to provide information on the medium- and long-run economic and social integration of individ-
uals that had been displaced in the wake of World War II. The survey provides detailed information on the
social and occupational structure of the German population between 1939 and 1971. It covers one percent of
the 1971 West German population that was born before 1957 and contains a total of 486,642 observations.
Foreigners were excluded from the survey.
In the survey, respondents provided (partly retrospective) information on their occupations and sectors
of employment in 1939, 1950, 1960 and 1971. The dataset also contains information on house ownership in
1939 and 1971, the year of birth of the respondents, their current marital status and educational attainment,
their year of migration to West Germany (if applicable), and their total monthly net income as of March
1971. The latter is recorded in seven ranked categories, and is missing for farmers (the self-employed in
agriculture who own arable land) but not for agricultural workers in dependent employment. The dataset
also provides information on parental background (the occupational status, sector of employment, and edu-
cational attainment of parents) when respondents were 15 years old.
The survey distinguishes between displaced individuals, migrants from the Soviet zone of occupation,
and the indigenous West German population (henceforth referred to as ’natives’). Germans that migrated
6from the Soviet occupation zone (or accordingly the GDR) to West Germany are excluded from the analysis.
Natives are deﬁned as non-displaced individuals that had lived on the territory of the later West German state
already on January 1st, 1939. Displaced individuals are those with an ofﬁcial displacement identiﬁcation
card (Vertriebenenausweis A/B). This card was granted to Germans who had lived in the former eastern
territories of the German Reich (or abroad) before the war and were displaced during or after the war.
Importantly, childrenofforcedmigrantsthatwerebornafterdisplacementinheritedtheofﬁcialdisplacement
status from the parent with child custody. This feature allows us to study the relative post-war economic
performance of migrant children.
WeanalyzetheeconomicintegrationinWestGermanyofforcedmigrantsandtheiroffspring(henceforth
referred to as ﬁrst and second generation migrants). First generation migrants are deﬁned as individuals who
were born between 1906 and 1925 and lived in areas east to the Oder-Neisse line in 1939. Individuals in this
birth cohort were aged 14-33 in 1939 and 46-65 in 1971 and thus of working age throughout the observation
period of our analysis (1939-1971). Displaced individuals that arrived in West Germany after 1950 and
individuals for which information on 1939 socio-economic characteristics are missing are excluded from
the analysis. The estimation sample for our analysis of the relative economic performance of ﬁrst generation
migrants contains 123,471 individuals, of whom 18.7% or 23,140 individuals are migrants (56.1% of which
are female) and 100,331 are natives (57.9% of which are female).10
Second generation migrants are deﬁned as children of displaced parents who were born between 1940
and 1949 and migrated to West Germany before the age of seven. This second generation (and their na-
tive peers) was aged 22-31 in 1971 and consequently educated in West Germany only. We again exclude
displaced individuals who arrived in West Germany after 1950 and individuals with missing information.11
The estimation sample for our analysis of the relative post-war economic performance of second genera-
tion migrants contains 59,373 individuals (49.4% of which are female), of whom 9,147 had been displaced
(47.2% of which are female).
Columns (1) to (4) of Table 1 report, by gender, means of available pre-war covariates for ﬁrst generation
displaced and native individuals, and columns (5) and (6) normalized differences in these variables. All pre-
war data refer to 1939. Apart from age, we have information on house ownership, the socioeconomic
status of individuals, and their sector of employment. The table also shows average years of education of
displaced and natives, which have been derived from the educational qualiﬁcations that individuals held in
1971.12 These qualiﬁcations may be different from those that individuals held in 1939. The vast majority
of individuals in our estimation sample (birth cohorts 1906-1925), however, should have completed their
education prior to displacement.13
Table 1 shows that displaced and native individuals are very similar in their pre-war characteristics.
10Imbalanced sex ratios in both groups are the result of World War II male casualties. Men born between 1906 and 1925 were
aged 20 to 39 in 1945. War-induced shortfalls among men were largest among this age cohort (see Bethmann and Kvasnicka, 2007).
11By doing so, we also restrict our analysis to those individuals that were living with both parents at the age of 15 (as otherwise
parental covariates are missing).
12The dataset only records the highest degree obtained. Years of education are inferred from the minimum years of education
that is required to obtain a particular degree. Information on the latter is taken from M¨ uller (1979). The education variable also
accounts for times in apprenticeships.
13Displacement started in late 1944. In that year, the youngest ﬁrst generation migrants in our data were aged nineteen (only
1.67% of all individuals). Only 5% of the individuals in our sample have more than 13 years of education.
7TABLE 1: PRE-WAR CHARACTERISTICS OF DISPLACED AND NON-DISPLACED
Men Women Normalized
Difference
Displaced Natives Displaced Natives Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age (yrs.) 23.2 23.8 23.2 23.8 -0.07 -0.07
House ownership 50.7 49.4 48.5 48.0 0.02 0.01
Years of education1 10.5 10.4 9.4 9.2 0.01 0.04
Socio-economic status (%):
Employed 88.4 89.4 55.1 53.3 -0.02 0.03
Self-employed2 4.5 4.9 1.4 1.5 -0.01 0.00
Farmer3 4.1 3.7 1.5 1.0 0.01 0.03
Civil servant 8.5 6.5 0.6 0.4 0.05 0.02
White collar worker 12.3 13.5 14.9 14.3 -0.03 0.01
Blue collar worker 43.0 46.1 22.8 22.4 -0.04 0.01
Helping family member 5.0 4.3 10.0 10.0 0.02 0.00
Apprentice 11.1 10.5 3.8 3.6 0.01 0.01
Unemployed 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.00 0.01
Out of Labor force 11.1 10.1 44.7 46.6 0.02 -0.03
Sector of employment (%):
Agriculture 18.9 12.5 14.6 11.6 0.12 0.06
Industry 32.7 41.3 13.1 15.7 -0.13 -0.05
Construction 8.8 9.2 0.4 0.4 -0.01 0.00
Trade/Transport 12.6 12.9 10.4 10.8 -0.01 -0.01
Finance 2.4 2.8 2.0 2.4 -0.02 -0.02
Public and private services 12.7 10.3 14.4 12.2 0.05 0.04
Unknown4 11.9 10.0 45.2 47.0 0.02 -0.02
Observations 10,155 42,206 12,985 58,125





0), where ¯ X1 and ¯ X1 (S2
1 and S2
0) are the sample means (variances) among displaced and non-displaced individuals.
1 Not all individuals may have completed their education prior to World War II. 2 Self-employed outside agriculture. 3 Farmer
with own land. 4 Includes all individuals who are not employed.
Most normalized differences in pre-war covariates between the two groups are smaller than 0.10. The
largest differences exist in the shares of men that are employed in agriculture and industry, a result of the
more agrarian structure of the eastern territories of the German Reich. However, even these differences
are sufﬁciently small (0.12, respectively -0.13) so that pre-war differences in observables can be (robustly)
controlled for in standard linear regressions.14
14Results of linear regressions tend to be sensitive to the speciﬁcation if normalized differences exceed 0.25 in absolute value
(Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009).
84 Empirical Strategy
We are interested in the relative economic performance of ﬁrst and second generation migrants in post-
war West Germany. To investigate whether ﬁrst generation migrants and native West Germans that were
comparable before the displacement fared differently in their medium- and long-run economic outcomes,
we run regression models of the following type:
Yit = a +Xi;39b +dDi+eit; (1)
whereYit is a particular post-war outcome of person i at timet (such as income, house ownership, labor force
status, or sectoral afﬁliation), Di is a dummy variable that indicates whether a person has been displaced,
Xi;39 is a vector of pre-war control variables, and eit is an error term. Our prime parameter of interest, d,
measures the average difference in a particular economic outcome between the displaced and otherwise
(as of 1939) comparable native West Germans. Economic outcomes are mainly measured at t = 1971.
Where available, we also consider economic outcomes in 1950 and 1960. For a subset of outcomes (the
geographic and sectoral mobility of individuals), t also refers to decades (1939-1950, 1950-1960, or 1960-
1971). Estimation is generally by OLS. Our analysis of income differences, however, makes use of interval
regression techniques, as the income variable is banded. We estimate equation (1) separately for men and
women.
Equation (1) controls for observable pre-treatment differences between displaced and native individuals.
It does not control for contemporaneous differences in the year the outcomes are measured, as such differ-
ences may not be exogenous to displacement status.15 For d to have a causal interpretation, displacement
status Di must be uncorrelated, conditional on observed pre-war characteristics Xi;39, with any unobserved
pre-war differences between the two groups that prove sufﬁciently persistent to affect individual economic
outcomes in the medium- or long-run (i.e., in 1950, 1960, or 1971). All pre-war differences between the
displaced and natives that do not exert such a lasting impact are irrelevant for the identiﬁcation of the causal
effect of displacement on medium- and long-run economic outcomes.
Note that d does not measure the causal effect of displacement on the displaced, i.e., an average treat-
ment effect on the treated (ATT). The inﬂux of forced migrants into post-war West Germany is likely to
have had general equilibrium effects that affected the West German economy at large and hence also our
comparison group – the indigenous West German population. Therefore, estimates of d do not measure
mean differences between forced migrants’ actual post-war outcomes and their potential post-war outcomes
that would have materialized in a ‘no displacement’ counterfactual situation. Rather, d captures differences
in the medium- and long-run economic performance between displaced individuals and natives in post-war
Germany. This is no drawback. From a policy perspective of the host country, the relative economic for-
tunes of the displaced are of prime interest, rather than the situation that would have prevailed had war and
displacement not occurred. From a technical perspective, estimates of d have a clear interpretation, as they
15However, we will also estimate speciﬁcations that add selected post-war labor market characteristics of individuals to our
baseline model. While the ensuing estimates do not have a causal interpretation, they are nevertheless of interest. They indicate to
what extent displaced and non-displaced individuals who were comparable before the war and also observationally equivalent at
the time that outcomes are measured still exhibit mean differences in their economic performance.
9measure differences between two well-deﬁned groups in the same economy, at the same point in time and
under the same post-war macroeconomic trends.
Identiﬁcation requires that conditional on Xi;39, displacement status Di is uncorrelated with unobserved
pre-war differences that still affect economic outcomes in post-war West Germany. For a number of reasons,
we believe that this identifying assumption is likely to hold in the context of our analysis. First, and most
importantly, displacement was not a choice and hence not conﬁned to a selective sub-group of Germans in
Eastern Europe. All Germans east of the Oder-Neisse line, and not only, e.g., those that could expect to
gain from re-settling to West Germany, were forced to migrate. Potential self-selection problems that are
commonly a case of concern in the analysis of voluntary migration (Borjas, 1991) should thus not play a
role in our context. Furthermore, and also of great importance, the displaced and the native West German
population shared common cultural features and spoke the same language.16 Such homogeneity between
migrants and natives, rarely encountered in other migration ﬂows, avoids the need to control, by way of often
imperfect measures, for differences in language skills that may result in productivity differentials. Third,
and more generally, the ceded regions in the East had been an integral part of Germany since the Reich came
into existence in 1871. They had all been part of the Free State of Prussia in the Weimar Republic and of the
Kingdom of Prussia before 1871, a feature shared by seven of the 11 administrative regions (Bundesl¨ ander)
of West Germany.17 The new borders of West Germany thus cut through Prussian territories that had been
integrated for centuries.18 Last but not least, and again rather exceptional for studies on migrant integration,
we are able to control for a wide range of productivity-related pre-displacement characteristics of migrants
and natives, such as their sector of employment or occupational status.
For the second generation of forced migrants, we also consider various economic outcomes and compare
them to those of native West Germans. As for the ﬁrst generation, we explore 1971 income levels and house
ownership rates as well as other labor market outcomes (employment status, sector of employment, and
occupational status). In addition, we investigate the relative educational attainment of second generation
migrants (as of 1971) and study differences in the intergenerational transmission of human capital between
migrants and natives. For all but the last of these outcomes, and akin to the ﬁrst generation, we run regression
models of the following type:
Y2nd




i is a particular 1971 outcome of person i, D2nd
i is a dummy that indicates whether person i has
an ofﬁcial displacement status and migrated to West Germany before the age of seven, and wi is an error
term (we dropped the t subscript because all outcome variables now refer to 1971). Control variables in Xi
include age and age squared of person i in 1971. Again, we run separate regressions for males and females.
Estimates of q provide information on the economic performance of second generation migrants relative
to that of their native West German peers. We will also consider a speciﬁcation that adds pre-war parental
16Note that forced migrants from Czechoslovakia, i.e., from the Sudetenland, also shared these features and were allowed to run
their own German schools.
17North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony, Hesse, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, Schleswig-Holstein and West-Berlin were
partly or completely founded on former Prussian territory.
18As shown in Section 3, pre-war differences in observables between the displaced (the treated) and the indigenous West German
population (our comparison group) are rather small in terms of standardized differences, a fact that testiﬁes to the general pre-
displacement homogeneity of both groups.
10covariates to the set of controls in Xi. Estimates of q then measure the average difference in economic
performance between second generation migrants and indigenous peers who were born to parents that were
comparable before the war. Unfortunately, the dataset only provides information on pre-war parental house
ownership. All other parental characteristics take reference to the time a child was aged 15, i.e., to a date
wellafterthewar, andarethuslikelytohavebeenaffectedbythedisplacement. Astheparentgenerationhad
mostly ﬁnished formal education by 1939, however, we consider parental education as largely exogenous to
displacement and use it as an additional parental pre-war covariate.
To analyze differences in the intergenerational transmission in education between the displaced and
native West Germans, we estimate the following regression model:
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i is child i’s education, EF
i and EM
i are measures of the respective education of the child’s mother
and father, and ui is an error term. Education is measured in years. Control variables in X2nd
i include age
and age squared of child i and a dummy for parental house ownership in 1939. The primary coefﬁcients
of interest in equation (3) are t3 and t5. They measure to what extent the intergenerational transmission
process in education differed between forced migrants and indigenous West Germans.
5 First Generation Migrants
This section reports our ﬁndings on the relative economic performance of ﬁrst generation forced migrants
in post-war West Germany. We ﬁrst consider long-term (1971) income and house ownership, with the lat-
ter acting as a proxy for wealth. Section 5.2 documents other labor market outcomes, such as individuals’
labor force status, sector of employment, and occupational status, and explores to what extent these out-
comes can explain income gaps between the displaced and natives. Finally, Section 5.3 investigates the
post-displacement medium-run (1950-1960) and long-run (1960-1971) sectoral and geographic mobility of
forced migrants and natives.
5.1 Income and House Ownership
Panels A to C of Table 2 report our estimation results on the 1971 relative incomes of displaced and com-
parable (in 1939) native workers, i.e., estimates of d from equation (1). Panel A provides two types of
baseline estimates: the ﬁrst stem from regressions of log income in 1971 on a constant and on displacement
status; the second from regressions that include also age and age squared, 1939 house ownership status, the
1939 sector of employment of individuals (seven categories), and the 1939 socioeconomic status of individ-
uals (nine categories) as explanatory variables. All income regressions consider only individuals who are
employed in 1971.
The top-left entry of Panel A shows that a even quarter of a century after displacement, both male
and female migrants exhibit signiﬁcantly lower average incomes than their native counterparts: in 1971,
displaced men earn 4:9% less than native men and displaced women 3:4% less than native women. The
11second row of Panel A indicates that part of these unconditional mean differences can be explained by
productivity-related pre-war differences between displaced and non-displaced individuals. Adding pre-war
characteristics to the speciﬁcation, the income gap between displaced and non-displaced men (women)
declines by a third (half) to  3:3% ( 1:8%). However, a sizeable income differential remains between the
displaced and comparable natives.
To assess the robustness of these results, Panel B of Table 2 provides estimates from two alternative
speciﬁcations. The ﬁrst seeks to assess the importance of potential sample selection bias that may arise from
the fact that income information for 1971 in our data is not available for farmers. Farmer status in 1971
correlates with farmer status in 1939. This correlation, however, is weaker for the displaced than for natives
because all displaced farmers lost their farmlands. As a robustness check, therefore, we exclude all individu-
als who were farmers in 1939 from our estimation sample. The ﬁrst row of Panel B shows that this exclusion
does not affect our results. The second alternative speciﬁcation adds dummies for the years of education of
an individual, a prime determinant of labor income, to the set of explanatory variables. Years of education,
as noted, are potentially endogenous.19 Hence, these estimates do not necessarily have a causal interpre-
tation. The inclusion of years of education dummies does not notably change our ﬁndings (see the second
row of Panel B). In fact, the estimate for displaced men is virtually the same as in our baseline speciﬁcation.
The estimate for displaced women even increases somewhat in absolute terms. Overall, the ﬁndings from
our two alternative speciﬁcations strongly corroborate the results of our baseline regressions: the existence
of a sizeable long-term income penalty for displaced individuals that tends to be more pronounced for men
than for women.
Displacement had heterogeneous effects on income not only by gender. Panel C of Table 2 shows that
average 1971 income gaps differ considerably between individuals who had worked in agriculture, industry,
and services before the war. For both genders, negative income gaps are largest for individuals who had
worked in services in 1939. They are considerably smaller for industrial workers and even positive for
agricultural workers. The positive income differentials for the latter group are sizeable. For both male and
female agricultural workers, they exceed 10 percent.20 Displacement, therefore, affect individuals quite
differently, depending on their pre-war sector of employment.
At ﬁrst glance, the ﬁnding of a positive income differential for displaced agricultural workers appears
surprising. Afterall, displacedindividualsdidnotre-locatebecauselabormarketprospectsinthedestination
region seemed more promising. In the next subsection we will show that the ﬁnding of a positive income
differential can be explained by the fact that displacement promoted large-scale transitions out of agriculture
into industry, where jobs were better paid on average.21
19Education is measured only for 1971 (the survey year) but not for 1939. However, the vast majority of individuals in our
sample (birth cohorts 1906 to 1925) should have completed their education by the time of displacement. Nevertheless, some may
have acquired part of their education also after the war. If so, their choice of education may have been affected by displacement.
20We again obtain similar results if we exclude individuals who had been farmers in 1939, that is restrict the analysis to agricul-
tural workers who had been in dependent employment before the war.
21Evidence on the long-term incomes of Fins displaced after World War II is consistent with this explanation. Sarvim¨ aki et al.
(2009) ﬁnd a positive effect of displacement on the long-term incomes of male (but not female) Fins who lived in rural areas
before displacement. The authors attribute this effect to accelerated transitions from agricultural to modern occupations among the
displaced. The study, however, provides no direct evidence on either rates of transition out of agriculture or the long-term incomes
of individuals that had been employed in agriculture prior to displacement.
12TABLE 2: 1st GENERATION MIGRANTS: LOG INCOME AND HOUSE OWNERSHIP
Men Women
Displaced s.e. Displaced s.e.
A. Income – Baseline estimates:
Unconditional (no covariates)  0:049 (0.005)  0:034 (0.011)
Conditional on pre-war covariates  0:033 (0.004)  0:018 (0.010)
B. Income – Alternative speciﬁcations (conditional on pre-war covariates):
Excluding 1939 farmers  0:038 (0.005)  0:017 (0.010)
Conditional on education  0:034 (0.004)  0:027 (0.010)
C. Income – Baseline estimates by 1939 sector (conditional on pre-war covariates):
Agriculture 0:104 (0.011) 0:129 (0.028)
Industry1  0:043 (0.006)  0:001 (0.022)
Services2  0:066 (0.009)  0:067 (0.017)
D. 1971 house ownership status3:
Unconditional (no covariates)  0:088 (0:005)  0:113 (0:005)
Conditional on pre-war covariates  0:100 (0:005)  0:120 (0:004)
NOTE: Estimates for displacement status. Each estimate stems from a separate regression. Income
equations are estimated by interval regressions, house ownership equations by OLS. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. Regressions condition on employment in 1971. Pre-war covariates
include: age, age squared, an indicator for house ownership in 1939, seven categories for the sector
of employment in 1939 (agriculture, industry, construction, trade/transport, ﬁnance, public and private
services, unknown), and nine categories for socioeconomic status in 1939 (self-employed, farmer, civil
servant, white-collar worker, blue-collar worker, family member, apprentice, out of labor force, un-
employed). 1 Includes construction. 2 Includes trade/transport, ﬁnance, as well as public and private
services. 3 The share of house owners among natives in 1971 was 52.2 per cent for males and 44.7 per
cent for females.
Finally, Panel D of Table 2 reports estimates of the relationship between displacement status and 1971
house ownership as a proxy for wealth. For both men and women, the share of house owners is signiﬁcantly
lower among the displaced. Conditional on pre-war covariates, displacement reduces the chances of men
of owning a house in 1971 by almost 20 percent, and of women by more than 25 percent. Quite evidently,
therefore, forced migrants have not been able to make up for the loss of property they had suffered as a result
of displacement.
5.2 Labor Force Status, Sector of Employment and Occupational Status
Albeit of central importance, income and wealth are but two indicators for the post-war labor market per-
formance and economic integration of displaced individuals. Other indicators are labor force status, sector
of employment, and occupational status. In this section, we document the effects that displacement had on
these outcomes. We also explore to what extent induced occupational and sectoral changes can explain the
long-term income differentials between displaced and natives documented in the previous section.
13TABLE 3: 1st GENERATION MIGRANTS: OTHER LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES
Men Women
Natives Displaced s.e. Natives Displaced s.e.
Mean Mean
A. 1971 Employment status:
Out of labor force 0:147  0:013 (0:003) 0:644 0:039 (0:004)
Unemployed 0:003 0:002 (0:001) 0:002 0:005 (0:001)
B. 1971 sector of employment:
Agriculture 0:094  0:079 (0:003) 0:199  0:122 (0:004)
Industry1 0:506 0:080 (0:006) 0:274 0:086 (0:008)
Services2 0:398 0:000 (0:005) 0:526 0:034 (0:008)
C. 1971 occupational status:
Self-employed3 0:148  0:050 (0:003) 0:081  0:025 (0:004)
Farmer4 0:073  0:068 (0:002) 0:028  0:018 (0:001)
Blue collar worker 0:419 0:130 (0:005) 0:342 0:137 (0:008)
White collar worker 0:253  0:001 (0:005) 0:295 0:038 (0:007)
Civil servant 0:098  0:004 (0:003) 0:021 0:003 (0:003)
Helping family member 0:008  0:006 (0:001) 0:234  0:134 (0:005)
NOTE: Means of the control group and OLS estimates for displacement status. Each estimate stems from a separate re-
gression. Regressions on the sector of employment and on occupational status condition on employment in 1971. The
regression on unemployment conditions on being in the labor force in 1971. Robust standard errors are reported in paren-
theses. All regressions include the following pre-war covariates: age, age squared, an indicator for house ownership in
1939, seven categories for the sector of employment in 1939 (agriculture, industry, construction, trade/transport, ﬁnance,
public and private services, unknown), and nine categories for socioeconomic status in 1939 (self-employed, farmer, civil
servant, white-collar worker, blue-collar worker, family member, apprentice, out of labor force, unemployed). 1 Includes
construction. 2 Includes trade/transport, ﬁnance, as well as public and private services. 3 Self-employed outside agriculture.
4 Farmer with own land.
Panels A to C of Table 3 report estimates of the effects that displacement had on our three additional
sets of labor market outcomes. All regressions include pre-war controls. Panel A of Table 3 indicates
that displaced men have a 1.3 percentage points lower probability of being out of the labor force in 1971
than their non-displaced counterparts;22 among females, in contrast, this probability is about 3.9 percentage
points higher for the displaced than for the natives.23 Furthermore, displaced men and women both suffer
from higher unemployment rates in 1971. The unemployment rate in West Germany in 1971, of course,
was very low (below one percent). Although elevated, overall unemployment risks for displaced individuals
were therefore still comparatively modest.
Panel B of Table 3 contrasts the 1971 sectoral employment structure of displaced individuals to that of
22This may have to do with the fact that the displaced, having lost their pre-war property and suffering from higher rates of
unemployment upon arrival in West Germany, were forced to work until later in live to make their living. L¨ uttinger (1986) provides
evidence for 1971 that pensions were markedly lower among displaced than among non-displaced retirees.
23However, this effect is essentially limited to women who were working as helping family members in agriculture before the
war. These women could often not resume employment after their families had lost their businesses and farmlands in the East.
14comparable natives. As is evident, signiﬁcantly fewer men and women among the displaced work in agricul-
ture and signiﬁcantly more in industry. Displaced women are also overrepresented in services. Additional
unreported analyses show that these differentials are driven predominantly by workers who were employed
in agriculture before the war. In this group, displacement reduces the probability for men (women) of work-
ing in agriculture by 39.8 (48.2) percentage points and increases the probability of working in industry by
31.3 (27.2) percentage points. Displacement, therefore, greatly promoted transitions out of agriculture into
the industrial sector.
Panel C of Table 3 provides further evidence for this ﬁnding. It shows that the occupational structure
of women and men in 1971 differs signiﬁcantly between the displaced and natives. Displaced women and
men are far less often self-employed, both outside and inside agriculture. This ﬁnding casts strong doubts
on the effectiveness of the Fl¨ uchtlingssiedlungsgesetz that encouraged and supported ﬁnancially the lease
and purchase of farms by forced migrants.24 Instead, ﬁrst generation migrants have a thirty percent higher
probability of working as a blue-collar worker. Displaced women (but not men) also exhibit a considerably
lower likelihood of working as a helping family member. Apart from the immediate loss of family-run busi-
nesses, this ﬁnding may be explained also by the relatively low rates of self-employment among displaced
men.
To what extent can these differences in the sectoral and occupational structure of migrants and natives
explain the income differentials between these groups that were documented in Section 5.1? To answer
this question, Table 4 reports the 1971 distribution of low-, middle-, and high-income earners by sector
of employment, occupational status, and gender. Agriculture appears to be largely a low-income sector:
Almost two-thirds of male and more than 96 per cent of female agricultural workers fall in the lowest
income category. In industry, the respective shares of men and women in this lowest income category are
far smaller. Hence, promoting transitions out of agriculture and into industry, displacement tended to result
in transitions into better remunerated jobs. This observation can explain why displacement has a positive
effect on the 1971 income levels of those who had worked in agriculture in 1939 but not of those who had
worked in other sectors before the war. The lower panel of Table 4 shows that the share of low-income
earners in 1971 is much higher among blue-collar than among white-collar workers, the self-employed,
or civil servants. As displaced workers are relatively more likely to be employed in blue-collar positions
(see Panel C of Table 3), the induced changes in the occupational structure of displaced workers can also
partly explain why displacement has a negative overall income effect. Our argument that induced changes
in the socio-economic status and sectoral afﬁliation of displaced individuals are important for explaining the
observed income differentials is further strengthened by the fact that these differentials become statistically
insigniﬁcant if we control in our income regressions also for contemporaneous differences in the socio-
economic status and sectoral afﬁliation of individuals (results are not reported but are available from the
authors upon request).
24Presumably, the measure had limited impact because there was simply not enough farmland that could be given to the new-
comers (Connor, 2007).
15TABLE 4: 1st GENERATION MIGRANTS: INCOME BY SECTOR AND OCCUPATION [IN %]
Men Women
Income (in DM): <800 800-1,199  1,200 <800 800-1,199  1,200
1971 sector of employment
Agriculture 0:663 0:316 0:021 0:964 0:036 0:000
Industry1 0:279 0:630 0:091 0:820 0:167 0:013
Services2 0:162 0:630 0:208 0:649 0:312 0:039
1971 occupational status:
Self-employed3 0:133 0:444 0:423 0:500 0:324 0:176
Blue collar worker 0:402 0:596 0:002 0:946 0:054 0:000
White collar worker 0:066 0:744 0:190 0:526 0:460 0:015
Civil servant 0:029 0:681 0:290 0:046 0:679 0:275
NOTE: Entries are the shares of workers in an income category. 1 Includes construction. 2 Includes
trade/transport, ﬁnance, as well as public and private services. 3 Self-employed outside agriculture.
5.3 Sectoral and Geographic Mobility after Displacement
The previous section has documented that displacement-induced sectoral changes can partly explain long-
term income differentials between natives and displaced. This section analyzes whether the displacement
had persistent effects on the mobility of forced migrants. Table 5 reports estimates of the effects of displace-
ment on the post-displacement sectoral and geographical mobility of individuals. To quantify the former,
we employ two outcome measures: the likelihood to change sectors between 1950 and 1960 (medium run),
and the likelihood to change sectors between 1960 and 1971 (long run). Concerning geographic mobility,
we consider an individual’s probability of changing the municipality of residence between 1960 and 1971.25
Panel B of Table 5 reveals that displaced men and women are far more likely to have changed sectors
between 1950 and 1960 than comparable (as of 1939) non-displaced men and women. For displaced men,
chances of a sectoral change are 50 percent higher (a 7.2 percentage points difference to the baseline). For
displaced women, the differential is even larger (a 60 percent or 8.2 percentage points difference). It is also
evident that overall sectoral mobility was lower in the 1950s than in the previous decade, both among the
displaced and among natives (see Panel A of Table 5). As the years 1939 to 1950 saw both World War II and
the actual mass displacement of Germans, higher rates of sectoral mobility in the 1940s are little surprising.
What is surprising, however, is that the relative differences in sectoral mobility between displaced and non-
displaced men remain almost unchanged in the 1950s. Similarly, the sectoral mobility of displaced females
exceeds that of native females not only in the 1940s but also in the 1950s. In the last decade considered
(1960s), however, sectoral mobility rates converge between the displaced and natives. For men, in fact,
differences disappear completely (see ﬁrst row of Panel C).
Large and persistent effects of displacement are also observable for the geographic mobility of individ-
25Change of residence information in our data is only available for the decade immediately preceding the survey year of the
Microcensus.
16TABLE 5: 1st GENERATION MIGRANTS: POST-DISPLACEMENT SECTORAL AND REGIONAL MOBILITY
Men Women
Native Displaced s.e. Native Displaced s.e.
Mean Mean
A. Change b/w 1939 and 1950:
Sector of employment 0:236 0:144 (0:006) 0:212 0:192 (0:009)
B. Change b/w 1950 and 1960:
Sector of employment 0:144 0:072 (0:005) 0:136 0:082 (0:008)
C. Change b/w 1960 and 1971:
Sector of employment 0:184 0:005 (0:005) 0:189 0:043 (0:008)
Residence 0:093 0:043 (0:004) 0:087 0:065 (0:003)
NOTE: Means of the control group and OLS estimates for displacement status. Each estimate stems from a separate re-
gression. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Regressions on sectoral change condition on being employed
in the ﬁrst and in the last year of the respective decade considered. All regressions include the following pre-war covari-
ates: age, age squared, an indicator for house ownership in 1939, seven categories for the sector of employment in 1939
(agriculture, industry, construction, trade/transport, ﬁnance, public and private services, unknown), and nine categories for
socioeconomicstatusin1939(self-employed, farmer, civilservant, white-collarworker, blue-collarworker, familymember,
apprentice, out of labor force, unemployed).
uals (second row of Panel C). Displaced men are almost ﬁfty percent more likely to have changed residence
between 1960 and 1971 than comparable non-displaced men. For women, the relative difference is again
even larger.
Overall, the evidence presented in Table 5 suggests that displacement had large and persistent effects
on the sectoral and geographical mobility of forced migrants. If the displaced had been voluntary migrants,
these ﬁndings could, at least potentially, be explained by a higher innate mobility of these individuals, as
revealed in their original migration decision. The fact that Germans in Eastern Europe were forced to re-
settle after world War II, however, precludes such selection-based explanations for our results.
6 Second Generation Migrants
In this section, we analyze whether differences in economic outcomes are still observable for second gener-
ation migrants and whether any differences that do exist resemble those for the ﬁrst generation. As deﬁned
in Section 3, second generation migrants were born between 1940 and 1949 and re-settled to West Germany
before the age of seven. As for ﬁrst generation migrants, we analyze differences in 1971 incomes and house
ownership rates and investigate to what extent observed income differentials can be explained by differences
in the labor force status, sectoral afﬁliation, and occupational status of second generation migrants and their
native peers. In addition, we explore the relationship between displacement and educational attainment, and
between displacement and the intergenerational transmission of human capital.
176.1 Income and House Ownership
We start by estimating the effect of displacement on log income. We use two speciﬁcations. The ﬁrst speci-
ﬁcation controls only for age and age squared; the second also controls for pre-war parental characteristics
(house ownership and educational attainment of both parents). Results for both speciﬁcations are reported
in Panel A of Table 6. They show that second generation displaced men have signiﬁcantly lower incomes in
1971 than their non-displaced peers. What is more, the magnitude of the income differential is comparable
to that suffered by ﬁrst generation men. It also differs little between the two speciﬁcations (-2.6 vs. -3.0
percent). In contrast, and unlike their mother generation, second generation displaced women do not exhibit
an income penalty relative to native women.
Panel B of Table 6 reports estimates of the effects of displacement on 1971 house ownership, using
the same two speciﬁcations as in Panel A. In both speciﬁcations, second generation displaced men and
women have a signiﬁcantly lower likelihood to own residential property. Compared to indigenous peers,
their chances to own a house are almost 25 percent lower. Additional (unreported) regressions show that the
negative effect of displacement status on 1971 house ownership decreases signiﬁcantly for females (from
-4.0 to -1.4 percentage points) and even vanishes completely for males if we consider only offspring of
parents that did not own a house before the war. These ﬁndings indicate that the lower likelihood of second
generation displaced individuals to own residential property can, to a large degree, be explained by the loss
of property of the parent generation, i.e., by a persistent adverse inter-generational wealth effect.
TABLE 6: 2nd GENERATION MIGRANTS: LOG INCOME AND HOUSE OWNERSHIP
Men Women
Displaced s.e. Displaced s.e.
A. Log income
Without parental covariates  0:026 (0:006) 0:006 (0:011)
With parental (pre-war) covariates1  0:030 (0:006) 0:005 (0:011)
B. House ownership2
Without parental covariates  0:029 (0:005)  0:043 (0:006)
With parental (pre-war) covariates1  0:026 (0:005)  0:040 (0:006)
NOTE: Estimates for displacement status. Each estimate stems from a separate regression. Income
equations are estimated by interval regressions, house ownership equations are estimated by OLS. Ro-
bust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Regressions in Panel A condition on employment in
1971. All regressions control for age and age squared of second generation migrants. 1 Parental covari-
ates include a dummy for house ownership in 1939 and a full set of dummies for years of education of
both parents. 2 The share of house owners among natives in 1971 was 12.4 percent for males and 19.0
percent for females.
6.2 Labor Force Status, Sector of Employment and Occupational Status
Following our analysis for ﬁrst generation migrants, this subsection explores to what extent second gener-
ation migrants differ from their non-displaced peers in 1971 labor force status, occupational structure and
18sectoral afﬁliation, and whether any such differences resemble those observed for the ﬁrst generation. We
also explore again to what extent differences in the sectoral afﬁliation and occupational structure between
displaced and natives can explain the income penalty for displaced men.
The results of these analyses are summarized in Table 7.26 Panel A of Table 7 shows that the unem-
ployment risk of second generation migrants does not differ from that of native peers. Displaced and non-
displaced individuals, however, do differ in their attachment to the labor market. Among men, displaced
individuals are 1.3 percentage points more likely to be out of the labor force. This difference vanishes once
we condition on pre-war parental covariates. Among women, in contrast, displaced individuals are 2.7 per-
centage points less likely to be out of the labor force than native individuals, a ﬁnding that proves robust to
the use of parental information as additional covariates. The higher labor force participation among female
second generation migrants may be explained by the markedly lower marriage and birth rates of this group
compared to their indigenous peers. Second generation displaced females have a 6.6 percentage points lower
probability of being married than their native peers, and a 4.4 percentage points lower probability of having
a child. Although we ﬁnd similar differences for men, higher marriage and birth rates are arguably of less
importance for the labor force participation of men than of women. Less wealth, which materializes in lower
home ownership rates, may also contribute to the relatively higher participation rates of displaced females.
Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that females, in particular, tend to have higher labor force participation
rates if they plan to purchase a home (see Havet and Penot, 2010, for a survey of the relevant literature).
The differences in the sectoral employment structure between displaced and non-displaced young adults
resemble strikingly those of the ﬁrst generation: displaced men and women work far less often in agriculture,
and more frequently in industry (see Panel B of Table 7). Displaced women are also signiﬁcantly more
likely to work in the service sector. These differences are large in magnitude, in particular for agricultural
employment. Young displaced males are 2.8 percentage points (or 64 percent) and females 6.3 percentage
points (or 84 percent) less likely to work in agriculture than their native peers.
Panel C of Table 7 reports estimates of the effects of displacement on the 1971 occupational structure of
young adults. Again, the results resemble those found for the parent generation. Second generation migrants
(men and women) are signiﬁcantly less likely to be self-employed in 1971, both as farmers and outside agri-
culture. Displaced men and women furthermore have a signiﬁcantly lower probability of working as a
helping family member. This is presumably a direct consequence of the much lower self-employment rates
among the displaced. In addition, second generation migrants tend to work more often as blue-collar work-
ers. The difference, however, is much smaller than for the ﬁrst generation and also statistically insigniﬁcant
for displaced young adult men. The difference for men, however, doubles when differences in parental
characteristics are accounted for. Finally, second generation female migrants are over-represented among
white-collar workers, and male migrants among civil servants and apprentices. Overall, the above ﬁnd-
ings suggest that displacement-induced changes in the sectoral and occupational structure of ﬁrst generation
migrants largely carried over to their offspring.
Differencesintheoccupationalstructurebetweensecondgenerationmalemigrantsandtheirnativepeers
26All regressions include age and age squared as control variables. Results of regressions that control also for parental pre-
war covariates can be obtained from the authors upon request. If not mentioned otherwise, the inclusion of pre-war parental
characteristics does not materially change the conclusions.
19TABLE 7: 2nd GENERATION MIGRANTS: OTHER LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES
Men Women
Natives Displaced s.e. Natives Displaced s.e.
Mean Mean
A. 1971 employment status:
Out of labor force 0:114 0:013 (0:005) 0:470  0:027 (0:008)
Unemployed 0:003 0:001 (0:001) 0:004  0:001 (0:001)
B. 1971 sector of employment:
Agriculture 0:044  0:028 (0:002) 0:075  0:063 (0:004)
Industry1 0:547 0:016 (0:008) 0:320 0:036 (0:011)
Services2 0:406 0:011 (0:008) 0:601 0:026 (0:011)
C. 1971 occupational status:
Self-employed3 0:043  0:019 (0:003) 0:021  0:007 (0:003)
Farmer4 0:015  0:012 (0:001) 0:003  0:003 (0:001)
Blue collar 0:508 0:012 (0:008) 0:227 0:026 (0:010)
White collar 0:285  0:001 (0:008) 0:592 0:042 (0:011)
Civil servant 0:101 0:023 (0:005) 0:052 0:009 (0:005)
Working family member 0:018  0:015 (0:001) 0:096  0:069 (0:005)
Apprentice 0:010 0:008 (0:002) 0:008 0:002 (0:002)
NOTE: Means of the control group and OLS estimates for displacement status. Each estimate stems from a separate
regression. All regressions control for age and age squared of second generation migrants. Regressions on the sector of
employment and on occupational status condition on employment in 1971. The regression on unemployment conditions
on being in the labor force in 1971. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions include age and
age squared as control variables. 1 Includes construction. 2 Includes trade/transport, ﬁnance, as well as public and private
services. 3 Self-employed outside agriculture. 4 Farmer with own land.
can, at least partly, help to explain the sizeable wage penalty observable for this group. Displaced young
male adults are signiﬁcantly under-represented among the high-earning self-employed outside agriculture,
and slightly over-represented among the low-earning group of blue-collar workers. Moreover, they are
almost twice as likely to work as low-paid apprentices. Unreported income regressions that condition on
1971 covariates provide supportive evidence for our conjecture that differences in the occupational structure
help to explain the income penalty for second generation displaced males. The income penalty halves in size
if we condition also on 1971 occupations, whereas the inclusion of other 1971 covariates leaves the income
penalty virtually unchanged.
6.3 Education and Intergenerational Transmission of Human Capital
The educational achievement of migrant children is an important yardstick of the integration of immigrants.
This section studies the educational attainment of second generation migrants and contrasts it to that of
indigenous peers. Educational achievement tends to be positively correlated across generations (see, for
20example, Dustmann and Glitz, 2011). However, displacement may affect that relationship.27 For this rea-
son, this section explores whether the intergenerational transmission process in education differs between
migrants and natives.
Table 8 reports estimates of the effects of displacement on the educational attainment of young adults,
considering three measures of educational attainment: years of education, and two indicator variables for
low and high education. Low education is deﬁned as having at most primary or lower secondary education
(Volksschule), i.e., only compulsory schooling (eight years), and no vocational degree.28 High education, in
turn, is deﬁned as having completed a degree that requires at least 13 years of education. This group includes
individuals with tertiary or upper secondary education (Abitur) and individuals with intermediate secondary
education (Mittlere Reife) that have also completed a commercial apprenticeship (kaufm¨ annische Lehre).
For each outcome variable, we again run two regressions: one with, and one without parental covariates.
If we do not condition on parental pre-war characteristics, displacement status is associated with an
average of 0.08 more years of education for men, and 0.16 more years for women (Panel A of Table 8).
For men, this positive correlation disappears when we control for parental pre-war characteristics (house
ownership and education); for women, the respective coefﬁcient stays statistically signiﬁcant but halves in
magnitude.29 Panels B and C of Table 8 show that displacement is associated with a lower likelihood of
being low educated, a ﬁnding that proves robust to the use of parental pre-war characteristics as additional
controls. No signiﬁcant differences between migrant and native children are observable in the probability of
being highly educated.
The lower likelihood of second generation migrants to be low-skilled may again be explained by the
sectoral and occupational changes of the parent generation. In 1971, more than 50 percent of all young adult
farmers and helping family workers are low-skilled. Second generation migrants, however, have a much
lower probability to work either as a farmer or a helping family member. This can be explained by the fact
that the majority of ﬁrst generation migrants who had been employed in agriculture before the war left that
sector after displacement. Displaced farmers lost their estates, i.e., property that would have predestined
their offspring also for a career in (low-skilled) agriculture. Migrant children were forced to look – and
compete – for work outside agriculture, i.e., for work that requires larger investments in human capital.
Evidence for a weaker intergenerational transmission of human capital among forced migrants corrob-
orates this conclusion. Table 9 reports results from estimating equation (3). Panel A of Table 9 shows that
years of education are positively correlated across generations. For non-displaced males, the coefﬁcient
estimate is 0:405 on the father’s years of education and 0:205 on those of the mother. The education of
27The intergenerational mobility of migrants has only recently received wider attention in the academic literature (see, for ex-
ample, Bauer and Riphahn, 2007; Dustmann, 2008; Gang and Zimmermann, 2000). In this context, it is interesting to note that the
educational attainment of second generation forced migrants, and the intergenerational transmission in education between migrant
parents and their children, were already an issue in the political debate in West Germany right after World War II (see Hughes,
1999).
28Compulsory years of education were increased to nine years in 1964. Individuals born in 1940-1949 were aged at least 15 in
1964 and hence not affected by this schooling reform.
29Some of the young adults who are aged 22 to 31 in 1971 may not have completed their education by the time the survey
was conducted. Our results may thus be biased if the share of those still in education differ between migrants and non-migrants.
Restricting the analysis to older age cohorts (individuals born in 1940-1945) leads, however, to similar results as those reported.
The same holds true for the analyses that follow. Results of these robustness checks are available from the authors upon request.
21TABLE 8: 2nd GENERATION MIGRANTS: EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT
Men Women
Natives Displaced s.e. Natives Displaced s.e.
Mean Mean
A. Years of education
Without parental covariates 10:82 0:076 (0:034) 10:46 0:162 (0:034)
With parental (pre-war) covariates 10:82  0:007 (0:030) 10:46 0:080 (0:031)
B. Low education (0/1)
Without parental covariates 0:124  0:021 (0:005) 0:271  0:040 (0:007)
With parental (pre-war) covariates1 0:124  0:016 (0:005) 0:271  0:030 (0:007)
C. High education (0/1)
Without parental covariates 0:219 0:011 (0:007) 0:160 0:016 (0:006)
With parental (pre-war) covariates 0:219 0:003 (0:007) 0:160 0:008 (0:006)
NOTE: OLS estimates for displacement status. Each estimate stems from a separate regression. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. All regressions control for age and age squared of second generation migrants. Parental covariates
include a dummy for house ownership in 1939 and separate controls for the educational attainment of both parents (that
correspond to the dependent variable of the regression).
the father is thus more important for the education of sons than the education of the mother. The same
holds true for daughters30 even though the difference in the inﬂuence of fathers and mothers is smaller for
them. The negative coefﬁcient estimates on the interaction terms between displacement status and a father’s
education (-0.096 for males and -0.051 for females) indicate that the education of the father is signiﬁcantly
less important for the educational attainment of migrant than of native children. Displacement thus weakens
the intergenerational transmission. This ﬁnding is consistent with earlier ﬁndings in the migration literature
which suggest that the persistence of educational attainment across generations tends to be much stronger
among natives than among migrants (Gang and Zimmermann, 2000; Bauer and Riphahn, 2007; Aydemir
et al., 2008).
Panels B and C of Table 9 show that differences between migrants and natives in the intergenerational
transmission of human capital are particularly pronounced in the lower tail of the educational distribution.
Compared to their natives peers, both male and female second generation migrants have a signiﬁcantly lower
probability of being low educated if they are born to fathers with just mandatory education (no differences
are observable for children born to mothers with mandatory schooling only). At the upper end of the skill
distribution, differences in the intergenerational transmission of human capital are far less pronounced (see
Panel C of Table 9).31
Overall, if judged against a father’s education, intergenerational upward mobility in education appears
much higher among the displaced. The fact that German farmers in Eastern Europe were deprived of their
30Similar ﬁndings for Germany are provided by Gang and Zimmermann (2000).
31Here, statistically signiﬁcant differences exist only for second generation males. Displaced young men show a signiﬁcant lower
probability of being high educated if their father is high educated. The difference, however, is small.
22TABLE 9: INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT
Men Women
Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e.
A. Years of education
Covariates:
Displaced 0:587 (0:211) 0:885 (0:218)
Years of educ. father 0:405 (0:008) 0:342 (0:008)
Displaced  years of educ. father  0:096 (0:021)  0:051 (0:020)
Years of educ. mother 0:205 (0:010) 0:250 (0:010)
Displaced  years of educ. mother 0:042 (0:025)  0:031 (0:024)
B. Low-skilled (0/1)
Covariates:
Displaced 0:016 (0:006)  0:000 (0:008)
Low-skilled father 0:192 (0:006) 0:263 (0:007)
Displaced  low-skilled father  0:085 (0:014)  0:088 (0:018)
Low-skilled mother 0:054 (0:004) 0:181 (0:005)
Displaced  low-skilled mother  0:010 (0:009)  0:008 (0:013)
C. High-skilled (0/1)
Covariates:
Displaced 0:009 (0:007) 0:013 (0:006)
High-skilled father 0:374 (0:010) 0:268 (0:009)
Displaced  high-skilled father  0:056 (0:025)  0:017 (0:023)
High-skilled mother 0:213 (0:016) 0:215 (0:016)
Displaced  high-skilled mother 0:020 (0:037)  0:036 (0:036)
NOTE: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions include age, age squared,
and home ownership of parents in 1939 as control variables.
land and ultimately driven out of agriculture again provides a potential explanation for this ﬁnding. With no
land and business to pass on to the second generation, children of (former) farmers were forced to look for
work outside agriculture, requiring them to obtain more education than their fathers had obtained.32
32This explanation is consistent with results reported in L¨ uttinger (1986). The author analyses the link between the occupation
of fathers and the occupational choice of sons born between 1920 and 1929. He ﬁnds that among sons whose fathers worked as
farmers displacement status greatly reduces the probability to obtain only low education. L¨ uttinger (1986) attributes his ﬁnding to
the loss of farmland that bereaved sons of the possibility to become farmers themselves. The birth cohort considered by L¨ uttinger
(1986), however, is not ideal, as many individuals (sons) in his analysis are likely to have already completed their education by the
time of displacement.
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Each year millions of people are forced to leave their homelands because of wars and natural disasters.
Although a sizeable phenomenon, both within and between countries, little is yet known on how forced
migrants ultimately integrate into the economies of their destination regions or countries. Studies on forced
migration are still scant, and in their focus they are almost exclusively conﬁned to the short run. This paper
studies one of the largest forced population movements in history, the displacement of millions of Germans
from Eastern Europe, and provides a comprehensive analysis of the medium- and long-run economic per-
formance of these migrants and their offspring in West Germany. As our study considers the integration
of forced migrants, it does not suffer from many of the econometric problems that are commonly faced in
analyses of the integration of voluntary migrants.
Our ﬁndings show that even a quarter of a century after displacement, displaced Germans are, on aver-
age, still economically disadvantaged relative to their native peers. In 1971, ﬁrst generation migrants have
signiﬁcantly lower income levels and home ownership rates, and signiﬁcantly higher risks of unemployment
than comparable (as of 1939) natives. Similar to their parents, second generation forced migrants are also
less likely to own a home and male migrants have lower income levels. Displacement had, however, strongly
heterogeneous effects. In particular, ﬁrst generation forced migrants that had been employed in agriculture
before World War II have substantially higher long-run incomes than comparable natives. We show that this
income gain can be explained by faster transitions of forced migrants from agriculture into other sectors and
occupations. Transitions out of agriculture can also explain our ﬁnding of a higher intergenerational upward
mobility in education among the displaced.
Overall, our results suggest that displacement had signiﬁcant and mostly negative long-run economic
consequences for the displaced. Language deﬁciencies or a potentially negative self-selection of low-
productivity migrants cannot explain our ﬁndings; and neither can unfavourable macroeconomic conditions
in the destination region (West Germany) that may have hampered the successful integration of forced mi-
grants. In fact, for most of the 1950s and 1960s, aggregate economic conditions were most favorable.
Although a faster transition of the displaced from traditional into modern sectors tended to foster a success-
ful integration, this greater mobility evidently did not sufﬁce to achieve long-run economic parity between
migrants and natives. In fact, the economic consequences of displacement and the ensuing adjustment pro-
cesses appear so long lasting that they are still felt by the offspring of the displaced a full quarter of a
century after World War II had ended. Our analysis therefore suggests that the substantial policies measures
that were undertaken to foster the successful integration of the displaced did not, as is widely believed,
achieve their objective in full.
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